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The Practical Intellect 
- design and use of knowledge1 
by Bengt Molander 
B JÖRN LINN SAID in the introduction to his lecture "The God of the Artifacts" that knowledge is more important than in-telligence; one reason is that knowledge includes judgement. 
This is important. In this lecture I stress that knowledge - or better, 
knowing, to emphasize the active form - is in the doing, it is know-
ledge in action, rather than something "underlying" it (in the mind 
or in the brain or something like that). In this respect I agree, for 
example, with Donald Schön's emphasis on knowing-in-action and 
knowing-in-practice.2 With such an emphasis it is clear that judge-
ment is part of knowing. 
Last week I gave a lecture at the "Interdisciplinary Program on 
Health Research" at Linköping University. As usual I stressed that 
knowing is in the doing. One of the people present at my lecture, a 
physiotherapist, wondered about the status of her knowledge and 
skill as a physiotherapist. (I don't make any sharp distinction between 
"knowing", "knowledge" and "skill" for reasons that will be clear 
shortly.) Her education, she said, began with theory and theoretical 
instruction, then she learned, through training and practical instruc-
tion, how to practice her "theoretical" learning. She had, however, 
now switched to theoretical research and did not practice her pro-
fession any more. And she had found that she had lost the ability to 
practice it. It was no longer in her backbone so to speak. This is a 
common experience I suppose most of us had as regards some skill. 
The question she then posed to me was: What kind of knowledge 
did I lose, theoretical or practical? 
There is only one proper answer to give: Neither. That is, refuse to 
accept the alternatives in the question as genuine alternatives, which 
is difficult, because the theory-practice dichotomy is so entrenched in 
our language and our thinking. But it is bad for thinking. Bengt 
Ahlqvist, in his lecture at this conference,"Architecture - field of 
Tema DESIGNTEORI 
Talk delivered to the Interna-
tional Conference on Theo-
ries and Methods of Design, 
Chalmers University of Tech-
nology, Göteborg, May, 1992. 
Bengt Molander, 
Filosofiska institutionen, 
Uppsala universitet 
117 
activity or knowledge", seems to have been trapped by a similar 
dichotomy: "activity or knowledge". I am happy to join his insistence 
on the need for knowledge. What we need is however knowledge in 
the activity. 
You have all seen the nice BRUL picture with a man (?), his idea, and 
a candle. It is a symbol of this conference. 
This is a picture of the design process, if we read it from left to 
right. It is a picture of the cognitive process, if we read from right to 
left.3 However, the most interesting thing is not depicted, viz. why we 
can say that the very candle in the man's mind - his idea - is the idea 
of the candle on the table. The idea and the product are connected in 
the design activity. Or, if we read it from the right, as a cognitive pro-
cess, the object which is there beforehand is connected to his idea by 
what he can do with the object (and other things connected to it) with 
the help of the idea. This is a pragmatic conception of design know-
ledge and knowledge of the external world. 
Given the existence of a traditional distinction between "theory" 
and "practice", I try to move exactly in between these two. And this 
"in between" constitutes the space where knowing has its life - the 
place of knowing in use (live knowledge, active knowing,... whatever 
label is preferred). This "in between" is the topic of my lecture today. 
I will discuss various concepts and approaches which will shed light 
on this (non-existent) borderline - which is a connecting line. One of 
them is "the practical intellect", but I will not start there. 
And what was my answer to the physiotherapist after the initial 
"neither"? 
Theory and practice are joined only in action, with theory-and-
practice. She had lost the connection. 
Attent ion 
In an interview on the Swedish radio a couple of years ago the Swe-
dish art critic and art professor Ulf Linde talked about "skill as a form 
of attention."4 It could also be rendered, quite generally: "knowing as 
a form of attention." (In Swedish: kunnande som en form av upp-
märksamhet.) The topic of the interview was art, and Linde said that 
Picasso was always attentive. He said moreover that even though one 
cannot produce geniuses by education, it is possible to learn attention 
as a routine. 
I am uncertain of how I should translate Linde's remarks into 
English. Perhaps I should add "application" to "attention". Anyway, 
the meaning is something like: having your mind-and-body-and-eye 
- that is, yourself-focussed on what you do {on what you do in what 
you do) but not in such a way that everything else is shut off from 
attention. Attention is something that belongs to the person, not to any 
part of the person in question, nor to knowledge abstracted from 
persons and action.5 
Teckning Hans Nordenström 
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"Skill as a form of attention." I take this as a characteristic of knowing 
(in action) quite generally. Attention is exactly on the right "borderline" 
between theory and practice. 
Attention can be learned in various ways, but it cannot be learned 
through "pure practice" or "pure theory", supposing for at moment 
that such concepts make sense. Such learning requires a kind of dia-
lectic, which I will explain through an example in the next section. 
Before I do so, one final general remark on attention. 
Attention cannot, of course, be defined as a purely general capa-
city independent of subject matter and context. Attention cannot be 
moved from one field of competence to another. It is, to a certain 
extent, tied to a certain task field (or certain professional field) .which 
in turn, is realized in a certain context. Attention requires familiarity 
with the subject matter and context. But attention cannot be exclusi-
vely task and context specific, then it would close off a practice rather 
than develop it. Attention must therefore also always be paid to the 
search for the unusual and the new. Knowing as a form of attention 
thus requires curiosity and even courage to go beyond the already 
established. 
A master class in musical per formance 
In his Educating the Reflective Practitioner Donald Schon discusses 
a description of a master class in cello.6 Bernard Greenhouse, cellist 
in the Beaux Arts Trio, describes his early lessons with Pablo Casals 
as follows: 
We spent at least three hours a lesson. The first hour was performance; 
the next hour entailed discussion of musical techniques; and the third 
hour he reminisced about his own career. During the first hour he sat 
about a yard away. He would play a phrase and have me repeat it. And 
if the bowing and the fingering weren't exactly the same as his, and 
the emphasis on the top of the phrase was not the same, he would stop 
me and say, "No, no. Do it his way." And this went on for quite a few 
lessons. I was studying the Bach D-Minor Suite and he demanded that 
I become an absolute copy. At one point, I did very gingerly suggest 
that I would only turn out to be a poor copy of Pablo Casals, and he 
said to me, "Don't worry about that. Because I'm seventy years old 
and I will be gone soon, and people won't remember my playing but 
they will hear yours." It turned out, of course, that he lived till the ripe 
old age of ninety-seven. But that was his way of teaching.... He was 
extremely meticulous about my following all the details of his 
performance. And after several weeks of working on that one suite of 
Bach's, finally, the two of us could sit down and perform and play all 
the same fingerings and bowings and all the phrasings alike. And I 
really had become a copy of the Master. It was as if that room had 
stereophonic sound - two cellos producing at once.7 
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But then, Schön says, Casals did something surprising, and he con-
tinues to quote Greenhouse's description: 
And at that point, when I had been able to accomplish this, he said to 
me, "Fine. Now just sit. Put your cello down and listen to the D-Minor 
Suite." And he played through the piece and changed every bowing 
and every fingering and every phrasing and all the emphasis within 
the phrase. I sat there, absolutely with my mouth open, listening to a 
performance which was heavenly, absolutely beautiful. And when he 
finished, he turned to me with abroad grin on his face, and he said, 
"Now you've learned how to improvise in Bach. From now on, you 
study Bach this way.8 
Now just a few comments on this story (I have benefitted from Do-
nald Schön's remarks).9 
When I read the quoted passages to a friend of mine who is a keen 
amateur violinist (Olle Sjöström), he immediately said: "The greatest 
sin of the amateur is that she only listens to how she herself plays." I 
think this indicates something important about attention. The most 
important thing was perhaps not that Greenhouse should play exactly 
like Casals but that he should learn to see and listen, that is he should 
learn to be attentive in playing. 
At the end of the quotation Casals says, "From now on, you study 
Bach this way." I take that to mean that he tells Greenhouse to study 
Bach now, not Casals! It is an important turning point. I think that 
similar turning points occur again and again if (and when) a person 
continues to develop her skill or her art. One of the tasks of a super-
visor or coach is to help the student - who may already be a skilful 
performer - to reach the turning points and then to continue on his or 
her own. The student must also transgress the limits of the supervisor, 
which sounds a bit paradoxical. She must leave the rigid following of 
rules and instead use them more freely with skill and judgment. 
Copying is therefore not only copying, but learning "a double 
attention". Let me sketch a possible structure: Greenhouse learns to 
attend to Casals' performance, and in this process he learns to perform 
and to connect his performance with a wider experience of his own 
performance, the way he learned to listen to Casals'. He learns this as 
a routine, by training. This routine then gives opportunity to let the 
attention go further, beyond the routine. The routine takes care of 
some of the basic attention (cf. Ulf Linde's words). Greenhouse can 
thereafter also listen to himself without being bound to copy Casals. 
He can pay "double attention" to his own performance. We can also 
put it this way: his attention has matured into a frame for advanced 
judgment and learning - not primarily about right or wrong, but rather 
about what can lead further and what cannot. 
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Attention is not a matter of "disinterested observation", it is a para-
digmatic example of interested observation, from the point of view of 
a performance with certain goals. Learning attention is far from re-
stricted to technical matters. 
When I have expressed it this way I have not only the example 
discussed so far in mind, but also "the practical intellect", to which I 
will turn shortly. 
In light of the discussion above, I want to remind you of the inter-
esting tripartite structure in the cello lessons. I have added some fur-
ther descriptions of what is "contained" in each of the three: 
- performance 
training (to do, to see...) 
routine 
rale following 
- discussion of musical techniques 
learning a language (about music) 
reflection on performances 
training of memory 
- reminiscences 
establishment of trust 
enter personally into a tradition (and carry it further) 
a narrative form of understanding 
I think this structure characterizes all knowing in action (live know-
ledge), not only learning. Time is important, knowing is a process over 
time. We can also put it this way: knowing which has not become a 
rigid ritual or "mechanical technique" is an ongoing learning pro-
cess. In the epistemology which has dominated science and philosophy 
of science time is however abstracted away. I will return to this 
towards the end of my paper. 
The pract ica l in te l lect I 
The Practical Intellect is the title of a book10 by Bo Göranzon, a 
working life researcher and now Professor at the Royal Technical 
Institute in Stockholm. It is a highly original book about knowing and 
skill in working life. He uses art, history of ideas and many other 
things to make visible what such knowing and skill is. The book is 
scheduled to appear in English later this year. I will briefly present 
some of the main ideas in the book, as I see them.11 
The origin of the expression "the practical intellect" ("the practi-
cal intellectuality") is a book by the master cabinet-maker Thomas 
Tempte, Arbetets Ära (The Honour of Work), published in 1982. He 
uses it in a section on "professional ethics" - and it is no accident that 
it is placed there. He talks about two kinds of intellect or intellectu-
ality, "the practical" and "the abstract".12 
THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT 
It is a common misunderstanding among people who are not crafts-
persons, Tempte says, that a craft is a kind of manual labour. Another 
misunderstanding is that less complicated thinking is required (com-
pared with what is normally considered to be "abstract" or "theoreti-
cal" work13). The truth is exactly the opposite, Tempte says, sophicti-
cated ability for abstraction is required. In advance, the craftsperson 
must form a conception of what the object to be produced will look 
like, how it should be produced and how it is to be used. And, finally, 
the object is produced in a process in which production resources, 
materials and labour are used - and in some cases irreversibly used 
up. If anything goes wrong it must be corrected by deeds, not by 
words. This whole process is not one of manual labour, but, Tempte 
says, a series of judgements and choices which require a considerable 
amount of mental energy. 
The intellectuality of this process, from the conception to the ob-
ject actually produced, is called the practical intellectuality. It is not 
abstracting, Tempte says. It is rather an intellectuality that gives form 
to ideas and things. We have something like design. But design can be 
understood (or rather misunderstood) from the point of view of what 
is commonly called "technical rationality", which is very close to or 
identical with Tempte's "abstract intellectuality".14 In Swedish he 
talks about "ett gestaltande intellekt". It is impossible to translate 
directly into English. Therefore I add a few comments.15 
The verb used, "gestalta", is very much like the German gestalten, 
which can correspond to English verbs like: form, shape, design, 
arrange, organize, create and produce.16 Basically to create, give form 
to, and produce. I am also convinced that gestalt in Tempte's use is 
strongly connected to unity. Gestalt is the form of the whole. A simi-
lar use of the corresponding German noun can be found in Gestalt 
psychology. Actually, the noun "gestalt" can be found in English, this 
is the explanation in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary: a struc-
ture, configuration, or pattern of physical, biological, or psychological 
phenomena so integrated as to constitute a functional unit with pro-
perties not derivable from the sum of its parts. Tempte, however, uses 
the active, dynamic form corresponding to the German gestaltende, 
thus characterizing the intellect(uality) as dynamic and active. It is 
also a very strong emphasis on artistic form, in Tempte's use - the goal 
is artistic and functional unity. 
An example may convey the core idea. Tempte has reconstructed 
"King Tut's chair", that is Pharaoh Tutankhamun's chair from 1300 
B.C.17 He then also tried to reconstruct the way the Egyptian cabinet-
makers thought and worked. From the gestalt of the chair - and his-
torical knowledge about the tools and ideas of the period - Tempte 
could get in touch with the gestaltende intellect of his colleagues. 
This reconstructive work can also shed light on Greenhouse's way 
to Casals' and later his own gestaltende intellect. Tempte was not 
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reconstruction (right). 
engaged simply in copying or mimicry, but in rethinking and recon- Kir|g T u t ' s c na i r (left) 
struction - which is to do something new. What Greenhouse did was .^^ T^^ ™?^  « 
perhaps also to reconstruct and thereby to create anew all the time. 
This comparison is well worth an elaboration, though I will not go into 
it here. 
I want to stress that I do not want to buy Tempte's dichotomy bet-
ween the practical and the theoretical (abstract) intellect(uality). The 
reason is that the way he explains the craftperson's process of pro-
duction - with its direct connection between conception and process 
of production - it is exactly what I called live knowledge, or knowing 
in action above. Thus it is exactly in between "abstract theory" and 
"manual work". The "practical intellect" is on the right borderline. 
The borderline is a connecting line, it consists of the skilful activity 
and judgment of the craftsperson. 
The practical intellect II 
In a discussion about Bertolt Brecht's play Galileo, Bo Goranzon 
says: 
In spite of more precise and reliable technical instruments which 
contribute to make each observation more differentiated, something 
always remains beyond reach. This is the paradox of critical know-
ledge.19 
Bo Goranzon also stays firmly on the borderline. His conception of 
knowledge and skill is a conception of something never closed, some-
thing open and inexhaustible. The knowing of the practical intellect 
has its life in changes, tensions and even paradoxes. The dialogue in 
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which several voices can be heard and no final agreement is reached 
is a basic idea. 
I will now highlight some features of "the practical intellect" 
which I find important. 
(1) The unity of routine work (for example, routine calculations) and 
skilled judgements. 
(2) The irreducible dialectic between trust and confidence in action 
and the critical awareness that "something always remains beyond 
reach" (the danger of scepticism). 
(3) Knowing in action {live and open knowledge) is the starting point 
and the basis of all knowledge. Knowing must be kept alive. Two 
aspects of this: 
(a) a "hermeneutic research method" in which results are always 
carried back to those who have been "objects of research" is 
necessary in research on skill and knowledge in action; 
(b) the presentation of skill and knowing must also be open and 
alive (and thus lead to further processes of reflection and 
reconstruction). 
(4) Understanding requires Gestalten rather than copies of reality. 
(This is a quotation from the photographer Peter Gullers.20) 
(5) One cannot talk about knowledge (knowing) in general. Two 
aspects of this: 
(a) the need for case studies of working life (no purely abstract 
account is acceptable); 
(b) there is no formula or definition which covers knowing of all 
kinds. 
Let me comment on a few of these - indeed, abstractly formulated -
points. I start with a comment on (4), partly because I have a strong 
feeling that it might be badly formulated. At least it needs some ex-
planation. 
Roughly stated, to improve understanding one should not try to 
copy or mirror something ("reality") as precisely as possible, but to 
give it a presentation with an artistic form. However, one should not 
think that any one form gives the right understanding. To improve 
(my own, other peoples') understanding here means to improve atten-
tion - make people see things, make them ask questions etc. The Earl 
of Kent in King Lear says: I'll teach you differences. Your can learn 
more about that from, among others, Shakespeare, Wittgenstein -
and Bo Gbranzon.21 Casals taught Greenhouse differences. Under-
standing then is improved by different Gestalten. Search for copies 
kills differences. 
Taking this as a basic epistemology of skill is indeed radical. One 
important aspect is that the most direct way to depict skill (knowing-
in-action) is by (as it were) indirection. Knowing about skill - part of 
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which is artistry, as Donald Schon has pointed out - comes to life and 
is kept alive in the medium of art. This also covers point (3b) above. 
An important form of (re)presentation which is open and is able to 
show tensions, real tensions, is dialogue. Of course I would like to 
think of the philosophical ones.22 Bo Goranzon has found a particular 
friend in Diderot (and the Enlightenment spokespeople generally). 
I have now commented on (3) and (4). I will add nothing to (5). I 
will however make some comments on (1) and (2), partly by referring 
back to the "Master Class in Musical Performance" example. Atten-
tion will again be brought into focus. 
The unity of routine work (for example, in musical performance) 
and skilled (professional) judgements is, I think, obvious. Training is 
always needed. Attention needs routine, in a twofold way, as I pointed 
out earlier. Greenhouse learns attention as routine by being more or 
less forced to reconstruct Casals' performance. The routine attention 
then makes further attention possible. Judgement is basically a unit of 
attention, experience and trust (confidence, security). 
The second point is a crucial one - and a difficult one. I will just 
make a few remarks. The moment when the trust and the critical 
awareness of "ignorance" (the limits of one's knowledge) exactly 
face each other is at the final part of the Greenhouse-Casals' story 
above. After the stereophonic performance comes Casals' own per-
formance. Greenhouse then learns about what he knows and what he 
does not now. With that insight he has to go on on his own. The skilled 
performer will later meet similar situations without the teacher -
moments when she must reach further. Routine also gives security 
and trust in such cases. Attention brings the critical limits into light -
sometimes after failure. The tension, the dialectic, is unavoidable. 
The musical lessons - and their end - also provide a beautiful illu-
stration of a central concept in the "epistemology of action", namely 
to follow a rule. This takes us into Wittgenstein's philosophy, and I 
will just briefly touch on that subject.23 
Any practice is governed by rules, that is what keeps it together as 
one practice. You do like this: ... (rule). The rule does not, however, 
"speak for itself, you have to learn the practice of following it. The 
formulations of the rule - "the theory" of how to do - does not decide 
how it should be followed, training andpractice decide. Wittgenstein 
at one point expresses this in the following way: "When I obey a rule 
I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly. "24 
In the first stage Greenhouse learns to follow Casals' rules. But the 
rule following is always open to new ways of action. Creative judg-
ment is possible - for example in different interpretations of a piece 
of music - but at the bottom line there is no room for choice. 
Casals shows the possibility of creativity. The piece is still Bach's 
D-MinorSuite. The rules are still there, the same, and yetnotthe same. 
Casals shows this by example, however, not by giving new rules. This 
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is given a dramatic representation in Greenhouse's/Delbanco's 
story. Thus, at the end, to quote Wittgenstein again: "Not only rules, 
but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules 
leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself."25 
Which is exactly how things are at the beginning. Think also about 
Tempte's way of letting King Tut's chair "speak for i tself. 
A person's own actions can, then, turn into a source of knowing. 
"Blind practice" is never by sufficient itself - again, witness the 
Greenhouse-Casals example: Casals may have said to Greenhouse: 
"Now you study Bach and your own performance! Let your own 
practice speak for itself, but be attentive in order to learn more." 
Now I turn to a brief comparison between two ways of approaching 
knowledge, to put what I have said in a wider context. 
Knowing - two approaches (two pictures) 
The traditional western - I mean modern traditional - concept of 
knowledge makes knowing something secondary to "what is the case 
in the world". There are many variants in the history of philosophy, 
and I shall not go into detail. 
I once more use the BRUL picture which is the symbol of this con-
ference. The candle on the table stands for what is the case in the 
world, in reality, viz. the facts. In the head (or mind) of the man (?) is 
his ideas, his possible knowledge, which according to tradition is 
something like a picture or description of reality. Now it is in general 
assumed to be expressible in a language of some kind. Be that as it 
may, the basic idea is that the statement, the picture or theory is a piece 
of knowledge only if it is true to the facts. Then, strictly speaking, the 
human being has been taken out of the picture. Try it on the picture! 
Truth - and in consequence theoretical knowledge - becomes essen-
tially a matter of relation between the symbolic candle and the real 
candle. One of the characteristic features of this picture (and similar 
ones) is the non-existence of human, cultural time (and space). There 
is a longing for timelessness or eternity. 
An alternative picture of knowledge can also be illustrated by the 
BRUL picture. Now the most important things are not "the facts" - the 
candle on the table - but the human being, a human being who has 
done something before the picture, and who is on his way to do some-
thing with the candle - or with the help of the candle. The basic ques-
tions could be formulated, slightly metaphorically, like this: Where 
does the man come from? Where is he going? That is: What is he 
doing? He is always on his way. This is a picture of knowledge in 
action. 
The focus of interest here is (to borrow G. E. M. Anscombe's 
phrase26) "knowing one's way about". The pair of questions "Where 
from?" and "Where to? are always present. In the first picture of 
knowledge both of these are curiously absent. And I want to empha-
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size that the first question (Where from?) is not a matter of "pure 
history". You have to "retrace and cross your tracks" again and again, 
because you cannot find where you are except by constantly looking 
forward and backward, i. e. by reflecting. Of course, we need all the 
time to refer to facts, from a critical point of view. But facts are not 
"just there", you encounter them in what your are doing, there are no 
"pure facts". I am inspired here by William James' pragmatism.27 
To give a satisfactory account of knowing in action in various 
professions and contexts demands a rich conceptual framework -
including human time. My second picture of knowledge makes room 
for such an account. The first excludes it. 
Several persons researchers on skills in working life have empha-
sized time, the time needed to form a conception (a picture) of relevant 
parts of reality, the time for maturation, the time for reflection, and 
very crucially the rhythm of action and reflection. I refer to Bo Goran-
zon again and to Maja-Lisa Perby's work on meteorologists.28 
To capture people's knowing - as well as "knowing itself - itmust 
be reflected through various gestalts. Knowing must be given form. 
There are a wide variety of relevant forms of "representation", for 
example: 
- narrative 
- dialogue 
- theatre 
- collage 
There is never THE form of representation. And representation is 
always an "unfinished representation" when it is not used-in-action. 
"Design and use of knowledge" 
I have not said anything in particular about architectural design. I have 
tried to present a perspective - to give knowing in action a Gestalt -
which can help us towards a better understanding of knowledge in 
action. Only those working in the field of architectural design can 
continue the reflection into that area. I have, however, two remarks by 
way of conclusion, which are both connected to "application" and to 
the relation between "knowledge" and "use of knowledge". The two 
remarks follows from what I have said so far, I am not trying to for-
mulate any new arguments. 
First remark. It is a commonplace that more and more (practi-
cal) "art" has turned into or been replaced by "applied" something 
(science, technology, theory of this and that). Practice is often con-
sidered as the application of theory. One can turn this upside down and 
say that theory, to the extent that it has a meaning which guides prac-
tice at all, is an application (use) of practice. Try to understand this 
as literally as possible. 
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Second - and final - remark. Knowledge is often considered as some-
thing without cultural form. It is considered to have only "logical" 
form. I have stressed the importance ofform in a wider sense, form in 
cultural space and human understanding. I have even stressed the im-
portance of forms in the plural, Gestalten. This is the way we come 
to see knowledge, and this is the way we can reflect on knowledge. We 
must as it were design the "representations" of reality, including 
knowledge. This is not an easy task. It requires artistic and critical 
abilities. The book from which I borrowed my title, The Practical 
Intellect, has managed to accomplish this combination to a large 
extent. 
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used, which does not sound very good to my ears. 
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16. This list comes from Langenscheidts Taschenwörterbuch der 
englishen und deutschen Sprache. 
17. Cf. Tempte (1982), Tempte (1988) and Tempte (1991). 
18. Tempte (1982), p. 46-47. 
19. Göranzon (1990), p. 99. 
20. "Förståelsen kräver gestaltningar snarare än avbildningar." Quo-
ted in Göranzon (1990), p. 122. 
21. He quotes the words from King Lear, Göranzon (1990), p. 169. 
22. Cf. Molander (1990). 
23. For an excellent, short account, cf. Johannessen (1988). 
24. Wittgenstein (1972), § 219. 
25. Wittgenstein (1974), § 139. 
26. Anscombe(1963). 
27. Cf. James (1978). 
28. Cf. Perby (1988). 
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